Turing Testinin sınırları üzerine felsefi bir inceleme
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Date
2024
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Işıl BAYAR BRAVO/Hamdi BRAVO
Access Rights
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Abstract
Bir makineye zekâ atfetmenin gerek ve yeter koşulları konusunda herkesçe uzlaşılan bir zemin yoktur. Ancak Turing testi, makine zekâsının yeteneklerini değerlendirmek için çok önemli bir kilometre taşı ve ölçüt olarak durmaya devam etmektedir. Bu makalede, Turing testinin geçilmesinin önündeki bizce muhtemel engellerden ikisini inceliyoruz. Birincisi, programlamanın temelinde yer alan mantıksal çıkarıma dayalı engellerdir. İkincisi ise hesap karmaşıklığı alanındaki bazı problemlerle ilgili etkili çözümler bulunamamasından kaynaklanan engeldir. Bu iki engeli ortaya koyarken mantık disiplinine ve teorik bilgisayar bilimine dair literatürü felsefi bir yöntemle sentezlemeye çalışıyoruz. Çalışmamız, yukarıda sözü edilen iki engelden hareketle ve bu engeller var olduğu sürece Turing testinin geçilemez olduğu sonucuna varmaktadır.
There is no consensus on the necessary and sufficient conditions for attributing intelligence to a machine. However, the Turing test remains a crucial milestone and benchmark for assessing the capabilities of machine intelligence. In this paper, we examine two of what we see as possible obstacles to passing the Turing test. The first is in the area of logical inference, which is at the core of programming. The second is the lack of effective solutions to some problems in the area of computational complexity. In presenting these two obstacles, we try to combine the literature on the discipline of logic and theoretical computer science in a philosophical way. Our paper concludes that the Turing test is impassable as long as these two obstacles exist.
There is no consensus on the necessary and sufficient conditions for attributing intelligence to a machine. However, the Turing test remains a crucial milestone and benchmark for assessing the capabilities of machine intelligence. In this paper, we examine two of what we see as possible obstacles to passing the Turing test. The first is in the area of logical inference, which is at the core of programming. The second is the lack of effective solutions to some problems in the area of computational complexity. In presenting these two obstacles, we try to combine the literature on the discipline of logic and theoretical computer science in a philosophical way. Our paper concludes that the Turing test is impassable as long as these two obstacles exist.
Description
Keywords
Alan Turing, Turing Testi, Yapay Zekâ, Hesap Karmaşıklığı, Monoton Olmayan Düşünme, Artificial Intelligence, Computational Complexity, Non Monotonic Reasoning
Journal or Series
FLSF (Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi)
WoS Q Value
Scopus Q Value
Volume
-
Issue
37
